

**IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE EIGHT JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
BROWN COUNTY, STATE OF ILLINOIS**

MICHAEL L. HILL)
BROWN COUNTY STATE'S ATTORNEY, and)
JUSTIN OLIVER,)
BROWN COUNTY SHERIFF,)
Plaintiffs)

v.)

KWAME RAOUL,)
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ILLINOIS,)
JAY ROBERT PRITZKER,)
GOVERNOR, STATE OF ILLINOIS,)
EMANUEL CHRISTOPHER WELCH,)
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF)
REPRESENTATIVES,)
DONALD F. HARMON, PRESIDENT OF THE)
ILLINOIS SENATE,)
Defendants.)

**No. 22-MR-
2022MR18**

Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunction

Now comes Michael L. Hill, in his official capacity as Brown County State's Attorney and as attorney for Justin Oliver, Brown County Sheriff, and for their complaint against the defendants, states the following:

1. House Bill 3653 (HB 3653) was introduced in the Illinois House of Representatives by Representative Curtis J. Tarver II on February 15, 2019.
2. As introduced HB 3653 consisted of seven (7) pages and sought to amend provisions of 730 ILCS 5/3/14/1, a copy of which is attached hereto as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by this reference.

3. The Illinois General Assembly website synopsis indicated that it primarily focused on voter registration issues for incarcerated individuals.
4. It received three (3) readings in the House and was passed on April 3, 2019.
See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.
5. HB 3653 arrived in the Senate on April 4, 2019.
6. In the Senate, the first reading occurred on April 12, 2019, and it was assigned to the Assignments Committee that day. *See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.*
7. Subsequently, nearly twenty-one (21) months later it was assigned to the Executive Committee on January 10, 2021, before being re-referred to Assignments Committee.
8. A second reading occurred in the Senate on January 10, 2021, during a perfunctory session after which Senator Elgie Sims states that he wanted the bill moved to a 3rd reading. *See Plaintiff's Exhibit 4.*
9. Senator Sims then filed Senate Floor Amendment No. 1 which totaled six hundred eleven (611) pages.
10. On or about January 13, 2021, roughly two days later, Senator Sims filed Senate Floor Amendment number 2 further increasing the bill's size by one hundred fifty-three (153) pages to a total of seven hundred sixty-four (764) pages. *See Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 at page 85.*

11. According to the General Assembly's website the bill now dealt with various topics such as use of force, redistricting, creation of task forces, and labor relations, among many other topics. *See Plaintiff's Exhibit 6.*
12. After these voluminous amendments, the bill was again referred to the Assignments Committee and approved for consideration.
13. Before the entire Senate, Senator Sims asked that HB 3653 be returned to the 2nd reading status. *See Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.*
14. This was approved without objection. *Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.*
15. Senator Sims then moved to adopt Floor Amendment No. 2. *Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.*
16. Senate President Harmon determined this amendment passed on a voice vote. *Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.*
17. Another reading was held on January 13, 2021 and referred to as the 3rd Reading. *Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.*
18. The title of HB 3653 was then read, and Senate President Harmon announced that only two speakers from each side would speak after Senator Sims Spoke. *Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, at 86.*
19. Highlighting the sweeping and broad nature of the scheme envisioned in those 764 pages, Senator Sims referred to HB 3653 as a "big, bold, complex transformational agenda." *Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.*

20. Senator Sims continued:

“First, the criminal justice reform: There’s reporting of deaths in custody; reforms relative to pregnant prisoner rights; medical treatment; alternatives to custody for those charged with three or four – Class 3 or 4 nonviolent felonies; the end to prison gerrymandering; the end to money bond and the Pretrial Fairness Act; the creation and establishment of detainee rights; additional earned program sentencing credits; modernization of our State’s mandatory supervised release program. Under violence reduction and victims’ services: expanded use of diversion-diversion courts – diversionary courts; crime victims’ compensation. And under police accountability: the State’s first expanded certification and decertification process; expanded use of force training; expanded crisis intervention training; the creation of the State – of a co-responder model for the State – for – for State government and policing; data collection; the creation of – of – the expansion and – and clarification of our ban on chokeholds; the creation of a duty to render aid for law – law enforcement officers; the creation of the duty to intervene from law enforcement officers; protection for whistleblowers who – who seek to make sure that the relationship between law enforcement and communities remain sound; increased body-camera usage; a discussion on the certification process and decertification process for law enforcement. This is a complete and comprehensive initiative.”

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5, pages 86-87.

21. Several Senators voiced concerns about the manner in which HB 3653 was moved forward.

22. Senator McClure observed that, “we just got this...a very short time ago”, and that he was “trying to ascertain what’s in the bill”. *People’s Exhibit 5, pages 87-88.*

23. Senator McClure and Senator Sims had an exchange indicating that it was not entirely clear what was being presented, with Senator McClure stating that he had “seen several drafts of this bill and this is now sort of new,” which caused

Senator Sims to reply that Senator McClure was referring to another earlier draft of the bill. *People's Exhibit 5, at 91.*

24. Senator Barickman also noted issues with the process, stating that this bill was pushed forward during a lame-duck session (*Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, at 99*) and mentioned:

[m]any of our constituents are going to read about legislation that consisted of more than 700 pages that was debated at 4:30 a.m., and they're going to read, watch, and listen to those news reports about this legislation and immediately cast suspicion about what's being done in the eleventh hour of this lame-duck Session, and they're going to be suspicious.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, at 100.

25. After further comment, President Harmon called for a vote and reported the vote as 32-23 in favor. President Harmon then declared HB 3653 as being passed. *Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, at 108.*

26. On January 13th, HB 3563 arrived back in the House. *See Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 at page 3.*

27. That same day the Rules Committee recommended Senate Amendment No. 2 be adopted and referred the matter to the floor for a full House vote. *Plaintiff's Exhibit 7, pages 3 -4.*

28. On the same day, Representative Justin Slaughter spoke in favor of the motion to concur, again highlighting the vast reach of this bill:

“regards to policing, HB 3563, Senate Amendment 2, provides a framework composed of seven critical components. First, under crisis intervention and

conflict de-escalation, the Bill establishes a statewide co-responder program, revamped our search warrant policies, and enhances crisis intervention training. Secondly, under limiting use of force, this Bill establishes a statewide universalized standard for use of force that identifies and defines what is excessive and prohibited. Under this section, House Bill 3653, Senate Amendment 2, allows...also provides a policy for the duty to intervene and to render aid. And lastly, it enhances use of force training. The third component is transparency. Under this section, the Bill creates a statewide body camera program, strengthens requirements for the reporting, collecting, and retention of police data and records. And lastly, it modifies policies pertaining to police officer integrity. The fourth component, oversight and enforcement. In this section, the Bill establishes a significantly more robust certification and decertification program for police officers. In regard to strengthening certification. What does this mean? This means better background checks, documenting continuous training completed, and continuous review of disqualifying conduct. This program also calls for expanding decertification, increasing the list of misdemeanors that qualify for automatic decertification, and also creating a discretionary decertification process based on the state's IDFPR model. And third, this also means expanding the officer professional conduct database. This would include notifications to state's attorneys and expanded requirements for departments to notify for concurrent terminations and leaving duties under investigation. Under this component, the Bill also enhances a state level patterns and practice division within the office of the Attorney General to investigate police misconduct. Ladies and Gentlemen, moving on, Fifth component, accountability. The Bill creates the Qualified Immunity Task Force to develop and propose policies and procedures to review and reform qualified immunity as it applies to peace officers. In regards to collective bargaining, the Bill deletes a provision of the Uniform Peace Officers' Disciplinary Act that allows collective bargaining agreements to override State Law with regard to peace officers. The effect of this change would be to prevent collective bargaining agreements from being used to shield officers from discipline, free misconduct, and use of force violations. Lastly, this section also removes the sworn affidavit requirement for police misconduct complaints. Sixth component, detainment. This Bill provides provisions to protect the rights of arrestees and detainees by requiring adequate access to phone calls and counsel when detained. The last component of police reform, the seventh component, officer wellness. These provisions establish statewide standards for officers to receive regular mental health screenings and assistance and also protections from mental illness discoveries. It's these seven components of our reform framework for policing that's contained in this Bill."

“We also took a look at sentencing reform. The Bill narrows our very broad felony murder rule to bring it in line with the majority of other states. It offers alternatives to custody in that it limits time on mandatory supervised release for lower level felonies. It modifies the detention of habitual criminal to entail and require higher level offenses, HB3563, Senate Amendment 2, offers a provision to provide for more judicial discretion for lower level, non-violent offenses. In regard to resisting arrest, the Bill requires a predicate offense to charge someone with resisting arrest. Lastly, the Bill establishes an investigation in reporting requirements for death in custody. In regard to prison practices, this Bill makes the following changes: It provides a provision for enhancing medical treatment practices within IDOC; the Bill ends the practice of prison gerrymandering; it modernizes our sentencing credit program; and lastly it provides provisions to protect the rights of pregnant prisoners. Also, and most notably, House Bill 3563, Senate Amendment 2, abolishes money bond and codifies the Pretrial Fairness Act. This initiative moves our money bond system from one that is based on an individual’s ability or inability to post bond to a more fair system that relies on verified risk assessment tools to determine if an individual is a threat to the community or a concern to not return for their hearing. Lastly and finally, in regards to violence reduction, the Bill improves the victims...the crime victims compensation process and expands eligibility for diversion court.”

*Plaintiff's Exhibit 7, pages 4 through 7. **Emphasis added.***

29. In the House, there were additional concerns raised about the bill.

30. In particular, Representative Windhorst noted that this was really “two large criminal justice Bills, one involving certification of police officers, one involving criminal justice reforms that have been merged.” *Plaintiff's Exhibit 7, pages 18 and 19.*

31. Acting Speaker Burke then called for a vote, with a reported vote of 60-50 in favor.

32. Acting Speaker Burke then declared the bill had passed. *Plaintiff's Exhibit 7, at 23.*

33. HB 3563 was sent to Governor Pritzker on February 4, 2021, which he signed on February 22, 2022. *Plaintiff's Exhibit 6.*

34. This, HB 3563 became Public Act 101-652.

35. Public Act 101-652 is seven hundred sixty-four (764) pages, divided into eight (8) substantive articles, one (1) general article, and amends, adds, or repeals two hundred sixty-five (265) statutes. *Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 8, and 9.*

36. The majority of the Public Act has already taken effect, with the abolishment of cash bail becoming effective January 1, 2023, and the phased adoption of body cameras finishing January 1, 2025.

Count 1
Declaratory Judgment Single Subject Rule

37. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the allegations in Paragraphs 1-36.

38. Article IV, Section 8 of the Illinois Constitution provides, in pertinent part:

“Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject.” Ill. Const. art. IV §8.

39. Because the single subject rule is a substantive, rather than a procedural, requirement for the passage of bills, an alleged violation of the rule is subject

to judicial review. Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill.2d 499, 514, 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1379 (1997), citing People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill.2d 235 (1995).

40. The single subject rule ensures the structured and well-informed debate and passage of bills as “limiting each bill to a single subject, each legislator can better understand and more intelligently debate the issues presented by a bill.”

People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill.2d 80, 83-84, 723 N.E.2d 265, 267 (1999), citing People v. Reedy, 295 Ill.App.3d 34 (1999).

41. The single subject requirement, therefore, “ensures that the legislature addresses the difficult decisions it faces directly and subject to public

scrutiny...” Cervantes, 189 Ill.2d at 84, 723 N.E.2d at 267, citing Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill.2d 499 (1997).

42. A public act that violates the single subject rule is not severable, rather the entire public act is unconstitutional and thus void. Reedy, 296 Ill.App.3d at 42.

43. 735 ILCS 5/2-701 provides a method under Illinois law for declaratory relief.

44. “The essential requirements for asserting a declaratory judgment action are (1)

a plaintiff with a legal tangible interest, (2) a defendant with an opposing interest, and (3) an actual controversy between the parties involving those

interests.” Cahokia Unit School Dist. No. 187 v. Pritzker, 2021 IL 126212, ¶36, 184 N.E.3d, 233, 243, citing Behringer v. Page, 204 Ill.2d 363 (2003).

45. Plaintiff Justin Oliver is the appointed Sheriff of Brown County and among his duties is the enforcement of civil and criminal statutes, supervision and security of the Courthouse and any and all prisoners in his custody.

46. Plaintiff Hill is the elected State's Attorney of Brown County, both a Constitutional and statutory officer.

47. Among Plaintiff Hill's powers and duties is the authority to prosecute all civil and criminal actions within his county in which the People or the County are interested, to prosecute felony and misdemeanor charges, as well as to inquire as to the source of any bond money posted by an individual with criminal charges, and to seek increases in bond amount or changes in conditions. *55 ILCS 5/3-9005; 725 ILCS 5/110-5(b-5); 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a).*

48. Furthermore, Plaintiff Hill has internal control over the operations of his office. *55 ILCS 5/3-9006.*

49. Defendant Raoul, as the Attorney General, must be notified of any challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, so that he can defend the statute. *S.Ct. Rule 19(a).*

50. Defendant Raoul also possesses significant new powers under the Public Act, such as the ability to conduct pattern and practice investigations of law enforcement officers, including those employed by the Brown County

Sheriff's Office whom Plaintiff Hill represents as legal counsel. *15 ILCS 205/10; 55 ILCS 5/3-9005.*

51. Defendant Pritzker signed HB 3563, indicating his approval of said bill.

52. "The Governor shall have the supreme executive power, and shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws." *Ill. Const. art. V, § 8.*

53. Absent further action by the General Assembly, provisions of Public Act 101-652 will remain in effect or continue to take effect, creating a real controversy between the Parties.

54. HB 3563 and Public Act 101-652 clearly violate the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution.

55. The bill is over 750 pages, addresses 265 separate statutes, and can be categorized as touching, at a minimum, 5 clearly distinct and divergent subjects.

56. Those subjects are 1) Policing and Criminal Law; 2) Elections; 3) Expanding the Partnership for Deflection and Substance Abuse Disorder Treatment Act to include first responders other than police officers; 4) Granting the Attorney General increased powers to pursue certain civil actions, some newly created; and 5) Expanded whistleblower protection.

57. Arguably, the Bill covers more topics than that, given Representative Slaughter's comments about seven areas the Bill and amendments reached in

the criminal justice area, as well as Representative Windhorst's comments about the bill really encompassing two separate law enforcement bills.

58. Plaintiff Justin Oliver is negatively affected by provisions related to policing and criminal law and granting the Attorney General increased powers to pursue certain civil actions.

59. Plaintiff Hill is negatively affected by provisions related to whistleblower protection, because his office is the default auditing official of all governmental offices within Brown County.

60. If the Public Act were to stand, the Plaintiffs would be burdened with not only significant new responsibilities, but the obligation to find funding mechanisms to address these unfunded mandates, stemming from an unconstitutionally passed law.

61. Whistleblower protection, granting the Attorney General increased powers to pursue certain civil matters, and abolishing cash bail cannot accurately be said to remotely touch the same subject, a single subject violation exists, and the Public Act must be struck down.

62. Plaintiff Justin Oliver is further harmed by the fact that his employees (or the office itself) are now subject to pattern and practice investigations by Defendant Raoul, and thus must devote resources to respond to these allegations whether they possess merit or not.

63. Civil administrative actions reviewing the constitutionality of peace officer's actions cannot be said to fall under the same umbrella as abolishing cash bail, whistleblower protection, or statewide voter measures.

64. Again, a single subject violation must exist and thus the entirety of the Public Act must fall.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for an order of this Honorable Court finding Public Act 101-652 violates the single subject rule and thus is unconstitutional and grant such other relief as the Court finds just and equitable.

Count II

Declaratory Judgment Violation of Article I. Sec. 9 of the Illinois Constitution

65. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the allegations in Paragraphs 1-36.

66. Article I, Section 9 of the Illinois Constitution provides in relevant part:

All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for the following offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption great: capital offenses; offenses for which a sentence of life imprisonment may be imposed as a consequence of conviction; and felony offenses for which a sentence of imprisonment, without conditional and revocable release, shall be imposed by law a consequence of conviction, when the court, after a hearing, determines that release of the offender would pose a real and present threat to the physical safety of any person.

Ill. Const. art. 1, §9. Emphasis Added.

67. The purpose of this section is to ensure that a defendant is given some amount of liberty until he is convicted, while simultaneously ensuring that the defendant will appear for his trial. *People ex rel. Gendron v. Ingram*, 34 Ill.2d

623, 625, 217 N.E.2d 803, 804 (1966) (interpreting an identical provision concerning bail under the 1870 Constitution.)

68. Bailable simply means that “...an offense or person is eligible for bail.” *Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Ed.*

69. Black’s Law Dictionary defines bail as “a security such as cash or a bond.” *Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Ed.*

70. The idea that bail embodies a monetary component is further reinforced by the fact that the Crime Victim’s Rights portion of the Constitution specifically states “The right to have the safety of the victim and the victim’s family considered in denying or fixing the **amount of bail**, determining whether to release the defendant, and setting conditions of release after arrest and conviction.” Ill. Const. art. I, §8.1(a)(9). **Emphasis added.**

71. Therefore, the Constitution makes monetary sureties an unambiguous feature of bail in Illinois.

72. As the law stands before the new provisions take effect on January 1, 2023, even a release on personal recognizance involves an element of financial obligation being pledged to ensure the defendant’s appearance. *725 ILCS 5/110-2.*

73. “Recognizance means an undertaking without security entered into by a person which he binds himself to comply with such conditions as are set forth

therein and which may provide for the forfeiture of a sum set by the court on failure to comply with the conditions thereof.” *725 ILCS 5/102-19; 725 ILCS 5/110-2.*

74. Should a defendant be released on personal recognizance and fail to appear, he or she risks forfeiture of an amount previously set by the court.

75. Thus, it is clear the bailable requirement of the Illinois Constitution implicitly contains an element of concrete financial incentives sufficient to ensure the defendant’s appearance at trial.

76. The provisions under Public Act 101-652 clearly violate this principle because individuals are either released without any bail or personal recognizance bond, and instead are presumed to be released on a promise to appear and to be subject to minimal pretrial conditions. *725 ILCS 5/110-1.5, 110-2.*

77. Notably, the law will no longer require that a sum be set that may be forfeited upon failure to abide by conditions of personal recognizance, but only that a “defendant may be released on his or her own recognizance upon signature.” *725 ILCS 5/110-3.*

78. Should the defendant fail to appear for a scheduled court appearance, he or she does not forfeit any money, rather he or she is subject to a hearing regarding the reasons behind their failure to abide by the conditions of pretrial release. *725 ILCS 5/110-3.*

79. As such, defendants are no longer bailable in Illinois as they are either released on their signature or held for a limited period of time (90 days) without bail pending trial.
80. This is a clear violation of the bail provisions in the Illinois Constitution.
81. 735 ILCS 5/2-701 provides a method under Illinois law for declaratory relief.
82. “The essential requirements for asserting a declaratory judgment action are (1) a plaintiff with a legal tangible interest, (2) a defendant with an opposing interest, and (3) an actual controversy between the parties involving those interests.” *Cahokia Unit School Dist. No. 187 v. Pritzker*, 2021 IL 126212, ¶36, 184 N.E.3d, 233, 243, citing *Behringer v. Page*, 204 Ill.2d 363 (2003).
83. Plaintiff Justin Oliver is directly injured by the provisions of Public Act 101-652, because as the appointed Sheriff of Brown County he is intimately involved with the enforcement of the appearance of Defendant’s before the Court and the safety of his officers in enforcing criminal law.
84. Plaintiff Hill is directly injured by the provisions of Public Act 101-652 because, as the elected State’s Attorney of Brown County, he is intimately involved in the bail and bond process for defendants charged by his office.
85. Under the current system Plaintiff Hill’s office provides information concerning the alleged crime and criminal history which may be used as basis for setting bail, is often asked for recommendations on bail, and also has a

significant role in seeking the modification of a defendant's bail, as well as conducting hearings on the source of money used to post bond. *725 ILCS 5/110-5; 725 ILCS 5/110-6.*

86. Furthermore, if the provision of Public Act 101-652 take effect, defendants will be presumed to be entitled to release without any monetary incentive on the line to ensure their continued presence in front of the court, a central tenet behind the purpose of bail.

87. This will inevitably lead to increased delays in cases handled by Plaintiff Hill's office, not only leading to delay in administration of justice, but also increase staff workloads and costs.

88. Without the ability to secure the appearance of defendants for trial, Plaintiff Hill will be severely hamstrung in his ability to proceed with the prosecution of cases, much like the Courts will be stripped of their inherent authority to manage their courtrooms.

89. Finally, Plaintiff Hill is harmed by the fact that Public At 101-652 impermissibly and unconstitutionally raises the burden of proof for detention.

90. The version of 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 that takes effect on January 1, 2023, transforms this section from essentially mirroring the contents of Article I, Section 9, to referencing multiple crimes not previously non-bailable under the Constitution (such as domestic battery) which now upon the filing of a

verified petition and proper showing, would allow for the pre-trial detention without bail.

91. This new version of 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 also impermissibly and unconstitutionally requires the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person the State is seeking to deny pre-trial release “poses a real and present threat to the safety of a specific, identifiable person or persons.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(d), (e)(2).

92. The Constitution only requires that the “offender would pose a real and present threat to the physical safety of any person.” *Ill. Const. art. 1, §9.*

93. As these amendments clearly contravene the constitutional right to bail, Plaintiff Hill will likely be presented with further delays in trials and hearings as the constitutionality of bail orders are challenged.

94. Defendant Raoul, as the Attorney General, must be notified of any challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, so that he can defend the statute. *S.Ct. Rule 19(a).*

95. Defendant Pritzker signed HB 3563, indicating his approval of said bill.

96. “The Governor shall have the supreme executive power, and shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws.” *Ill. Const. art. V, § 8.*

97. Absent further action by the General Assembly, provisions of Public Act 101-652 will remain in effect or continue to take effect, creating a real controversy between the Parties.

98. That because individuals are no longer bailable, the bail provisions of Public Act 101-652, violate Article I, Section 9 of the Illinois Constitution and must be struck down. *Plaintiff's Exhibit 10.*

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff's pray for an order of this Honorable Court finding Public Act 101-652 violates the bail provision in Article 1, Section 9 of the Illinois Constitution and thus is unconstitutional in part and grant such other relief as this Court finds just and equitable.

Count III
Declaratory Judgment Separation of Powers Violation

99. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the allegations in Paragraphs 1-36.

100. Under the provisions of Public At 101-652 defendants are to be presumed to be subject to non-monetary bail, except in limited circumstances where they are held pending trial. *725 ILCS 5/110-2.*

101. Instead of monetary bail, defendants are subject only to conditions they must abide by upon release and a signature with no surety. *725 ILCS 5/110-1.5; 110-2.*

102. The Separation of Powers clause prohibits one branch of government from exercising “powers properly belonging to another.” *Ill. Const. art. II, §1*; *Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp.*, 237 Ill.2d 217, 239 (2010).
103. “...the legislature is without authority to interfere with a ‘product of this court’s supervisory and administrative responsibility.’” *People v. Joseph*, 113 Ill.2d 36, 45, 496 N.E.2d 501, 506 (1985) citing *People v. Jackson*, 69 Ill.2d 252(1977).
104. “The constitutional right to bail must be qualified by the authority of the courts, as an incident of their power to manage the conduct of proceedings before them, to deny or revoke bail when such action is appropriate to preserve the orderly process of criminal procedure.” *People ex rel. Hemingway v. Elrod*, 60 Ill.2d 74, 79 (1975).
105. The General Assembly may only enact legislation “that complement[s] the authority of the judiciary or that [has] only a peripheral effect on court administration.” *Kunkel v. Walton*, 179 Ill.2d 519, 528, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (1997), citing *People v. Williams*, 124 Ill.2d 300 (1988).
106. “Consequently, the separation of powers principle is violated when a legislative enactment unduly encroaches upon the inherent powers of the judiciary, or directly and irreconcilably conflicts with a rule of this court on a

matter within the court's authority." *Kunkel v. Walton*, 179 Ill.2d 519, 528, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (1997).

107. Here, by eliminating the ability to set bail, the General Assembly has completely removed a tool the courts have as an inherent right to use to manage the court process.
108. This is not something incidental to the administration of the courts, or a supplement of their authority, but rather a "big, bold, complex transformational agenda" fundamentally altering the several courts' authority.
109. As this is an intrusion in one of the core components of the several courts' authority, the legislation is an unlawful intrusion into the central powers of the courts, and thus, must violate the separation of powers doctrine.
110. 735 ILCS 5/2-701 provides a method under Illinois law for declaratory relief.
111. "The essential requirements for asserting a declaratory judgment action are (1) a plaintiff with a legal tangible interest, (2) a defendant with an opposing interest, and (3) an actual controversy between the parties involving those interests." *Cahokia Unit School Dist. No. 187 v. Pritzker*, 2021 IL 126212, ¶36, 184 N.E.3d, 233, 243, citing *Beahringer v. Page*, 204 Ill.2d 363 (2003).

112. Plaintiff Justin Oliver is directly injured by the provisions of Public Act 101-652 because he is intimately involved in the bail process for defendants charged with crimes.
113. Plaintiff Hill is directly injured by the provisions of Public Act 101-652 because, as the elected State's Attorney of Brown County, he is intimately involved in the bail and bond process for defendants charged by his office.
114. Under the current system Plaintiff Hill's office provides information concerning the alleged crime and criminal history which may be used as basis for setting bail, is often asked for recommendations on bail, and also has a significant role in seeking the modification of a defendant's bail, as well as conducting hearings on the source of money used to post bond. *725 ILCS 5/110-5; 725 ILCS 5/110-6.*
115. Furthermore, if the provision of Public Act 101-652 take effect, defendants will be presumed to be entitled to release without any monetary incentive on the line to ensure their continued presence in front of the court, a central tenet behind the purpose of bail.
116. This will inevitably lead to increased delays in cases handled by Plaintiff Hill's office, not only leading to delay in administration of justice, but also increased staff workloads and costs.

117. Without the ability to secure the appearance of defendants for trial, Plaintiff Hill will be severely hamstrung in his ability to proceed with the prosecution of cases.
118. Additionally, due to the provisions in Public Act 101-652, Plaintiff Hill can no longer appeal to the Courts for assistance in ensuring a defendant's appearance as they are largely hamstrung as well.
119. That disclosures to the accused are governed by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 412.
120. That Public Act 101-652 set new guidelines for disclosures, which states "Prior to the hearing the State shall tender to the defendant copies of defendant's criminal history available, any written or recorded statements, and the substance of any oral statements made by any person, if relied upon by the State in its petition, and any police reports in the State's Attorney's possession at the time of the hearing that are required to be disclosed to the defense under Illinois Supreme Court rules." 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f) (1)
121. That Public Act 101-652 has essentially rewritten the Illinois Supreme Court Rule 412.
122. That this is a further incursion on the inherent powers of the judiciary.

123. Defendant Raoul, as the Attorney General, must be notified of any challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, so that he can defend the statute. *S.Ct.Rule 19(a)*.
124. Defendant Pritzker signed HB 3563, indicating his approval of said bill.
125. "The Governor shall have the supreme executive power, and shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws." *Ill.Const. art. V, § 8*.
126. Absent further action by the General Assembly, provisions of Public Act 101-652 will remain in effect or continue to take effect, creating a real controversy between the Parties.
127. As such, the bail provisions of Public Act 101-652 must be stricken as they represent an unlawful intrusion into the power of the judiciary and thus a separation of powers violation. *Plaintiff's Exhibit 10*.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff's pray for an order of this Honorable Court finding that Public Act 101-652 violates the Separation of Powers doctrine with regard to bail and thus is unconstitutional in part and granting such other relief as this Court finds just and equitable.

Count IV
Declaratory Judgment Violation of Three Readings Clause

128. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the allegations in Paragraph 1-36.

129. Article IV, Section 8 of the Illinois Constitution provides in pertinent part

“A bill shall be read by title on three different days in each house.” *Ill. Const. art. IV, §8(d)*.

130. The Three Readings Rule applies not only to the original bill, but to amendments when they represent a substantial departure from the original bill.

131. In *Giebelhausen v. Daley*, 407 Ill.25, 48, 95 N.E.2d 84 (1950), our supreme court held that the “complete substitution of a new bill under the original number, dealing with a subject which was not akin or closely allied to the original bill, and which was not read three times in each House, after it has been so altered, [was a] clear violation of” a similar three-readings rule in the 1870 Constitution. *See Ill. Const. 1870, art. IV, §13 (“Every bill shall be read at large on three different days, in each house * * *.”)*. *See also Doe v. Lyft, Inc.*, 2020 IL.App.(1st) 191328, ¶53, 176 N.E.3d 863, 880 (1st Dist., 4th Div., 2021), appeal allowed, 163 N.E.3d 713.

132. As more fully laid out in Paragraphs 1-17, the two amendments made to HB 3653 represented a significant departure from the original seven (7) page bill effecting one statute, to a behemoth bill more than one-hundred (100) times the size at seven hundred sixty-four (764) pages and affecting no less than two hundred sixty-five (265) separate statutes.

133. This constitutes a total substitution of the original HB 3653, and thus subjects the amendments to the Three Readings Rule.
134. Upon information and belief, HB 3653 as amended was signed by the Senate President Harmon and Speaker Welch.
135. The Plaintiffs readily acknowledges that at this time a challenge to legislation under the Three Readings is foreclosed by the Enrolled Bill doctrine, assuming HB 3653 was signed by President Harmon and Speaker Welch.
136. The Enrolled Bill doctrine essentially provides that once the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate certify that the procedural requirements for passing legislation have been met, there is a conclusive presumption the procedural requirements have been met. *Lyft, 2020 IL.App.(1st) at ¶54, 176 N.E.3d at 881.*
137. The Plaintiffs do not concede that this ends the inquiry, and affirmatively asserts that the Enrolled Bill doctrine must fall as it does not comply with Art.IV, Section 8.
138. To allow it to stand would be to allow the General Assembly to skirt the Constitution by certifying, with no standards, penalty, or review, that they have in fact complied with the Constitutional requirements in Art. IV, Section 8.

139. That this doctrine has been subject to significant abuse by the General Assembly and has not escaped the notice of the Supreme Court.
140. “We noted in *Geja’s Café* and again in *Cutinello* that the legislature had shown remarkably poor self-discipline in policing itself in regard to the three-readings requirement.” *Friends of Parks v. Chicago Park Dist.*, 203 Ill.2d 312, 329, 786 N.E.2d 161, 171 (2003).
141. “If the General Assembly continues its poor record of policing itself, we reserve the right to revisit this issue on another day to decide the continued propriety of ignoring this constitutional violation.” *Geja’s Café v. Metro Pier & Exposition Auth.*, 153 Ill.2d 239, 260, 606 N.E.2d 1221 (1992).
142. This systematic issue was acknowledged as recently as 2020 in *Lyft*, *supra*.
143. The passage of HB 3653/Public Act 101-652 provides the perfect example of why the courts must revisit the Enrolled Bill doctrine.
144. A simple and likely uncontroversial bill was gutted and replaced by a final product that bore no resemblance to the original material, delivered to Senators at 4:30 a.m. during a lame duck session, and read twice in one day at the Senate and then simply passed in the House.
145. Furthermore, it appears from the recording of the proceedings that not only did Senate Amendment No. 2 only receive two (2) readings (both occurring on the same day) in the Senate, but upon return to the House it received no

readings on the amended version and was simply called for a vote on the concurrence.

146. Given the substantial changes made by Senate Amendment No.'s 1 and 2, the House was required to re-read the new document three (3) separate times, as the bill in its current form bore no resemblance to the original passed out of the House.

147. Therefore, a Three Readings violation occurred.

148. Given the General Assembly's clear inability to police themselves on the matter, the Enrolled Bill doctrine must be abrogated.

149. 735 ILCS 5/2-701 provides a method under Illinois law for declaratory relief.

150. "The essential requirements for asserting a declaratory judgment action are (1) a plaintiff with a legal tangible interest, (2) a defendant with an opposing interest, and (3) an actual controversy between the parties involving those interests." *Cahokia Unit School Dist. No. 187 v. Pritzker*, 2021 IL 126212, ¶36, 184 N.E.3d, 233, 243, citing *Behringer v. Page*, 204 Ill.2d 363 (2003).

151. Plaintiff Hill is negatively affected by provisions related to whistleblower protection, because his office is the default auditing official of all governmental offices within Brown County.

152. If the Public Act were to stand, the Plaintiffs would be burdened with not only significant new responsibilities, but the obligation to find funding mechanisms to address these unfunded mandates, stemming from an unconstitutionally passed law.
153. Plaintiff Justin Oliver is further harmed by the fact that his employees (or the office itself) are now subject to pattern and practice investigations by Defendant Raoul, and thus must devote public resources to respond to these allegations whether they possess merit or not.
154. Finally, the Plaintiffs will face injury under the new bail provisions as laid out in Counts II and III.
155. All of these injuries are directly traceable to an unconstitutionally passed law, now known as Public Act 101-652.
156. Defendant Raoul, as the Attorney General, must be notified of any challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, so that he can defend the statute. *S.Ct.Rule 19(a)*.
157. Defendant Pritzker signed HB 3563, indicating his approval of said bill.
158. "The Governor shall have the supreme executive power, and shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws." *Ill.Const. art. V, § 8*.

159. Upon information and belief Defendant Welch, as the Speaker of the House, indicated that all procedural requirements for the passage of HB 3653 were met by signing the bill.

160. The procedural requirements were not met.

161. Upon information and belief Defendant Harmon, as Senate President, indicated that all procedural requirements for the passage of HB 3653 were met by signing the bill.

162. The procedural requirements were not met.

163. Absent further action by the General Assembly, provisions of Public Act 101-652 will remain in effect or continue to take effect, creating a real controversy between the Parties.

164. As HB 3653 was passed without three readings on separate days, in each chamber, and since the Enrolled Bill doctrine clearly violates the Illinois Constitution, the doctrine must fall, and Public Act 101-652 must be declared unconstitutional and repealed in full.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for an order of this Honorable Court finding that Public Act 101-652 violates the Three Readings rule and thus is unconstitutional, that the Enrolled Bill Doctrine violates the Constitution and should be abrogated, grant such other relief as this Court finds just and equitable.

Count V
Injunctive Relief

165. The Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the allegations in Paragraphs 1-36.

166. That a statute is unconstitutionally vague if “It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of Due Process if it is so vague and standardless it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide without any legally fixed standards what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.” *Giaccio v. Pennsylvania*, 382 U.S. 399, 402,403(1966).

167. That Public Act 101-652 must be ruled unconstitutional for vagueness in that “It is established that no one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as what the State commands or forbids” *Lanzetta v. New Jersey*, 306 U.S 451, 453(1932).

168. That the provisions of Public Act 101-652 concerning pretrial release, speedy trials and other procedural rules are currently the topic of multiple committees including the Pretrial Practices Oversight Board working with the Administrative Office of Illinois Courts to determine exactly what is the meaning of these new requirements and how they can be administered consistently.

169. That despite meeting monthly since July 2021, the Pretrial Practices Oversight Board has been unable to articulate uniform guidelines to comply with this Act.
170. That Public Act 101-652 imposes new procedural requirements on peace officers, state's attorneys and judges without articulating how these requirements may be satisfied.
171. That pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/103-3.5 persons being held "**in police custody**" (emphasis added) are required to receive certain rights such as the right to a phone call, the right to communicate with family members or an attorney within three hours however there is no definition of what constitutes being held in police custody. The statute is too vague to inform officers or the court how to interpret and enforce.
172. That pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) "Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction 120 days from the date he or she was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant". Does the custody commence at the time an individual is brought to a police station; the time they are charged with a crime; the time they are first brought before a judge? The statute is too vague to allow the police, attorneys or the court to establish when the clock begins to run.

173. That pursuant to 725 ILCS5/106D-1(a) states “Whenever the appearance in person... in court is required of anyone held in place of custody or confinement ...the chief judge of the circuit by rule may permit the personal appearance to be made by way two-way audio visual communication including closed circuit in the following proceedings: (1) the initial appearance before a judge on a criminal complaint at which the conditions of pretrial release will be set”. Contrast this language to that of 725 ILCS 5/109-1”...Whenever a person arrested...is required to be taken before a judge... a charge may be filed... by way of a two-way closed circuit television system except that a hearing to deny pretrial release may not be conducted by way of closed circuit television.” The two provisions of the law are in conflict preventing the Sheriff, the State’s Attorney and the Court from determining what procedure is required under the statute. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it lacks minimal standards to guide law enforcement officers. *Chicago v Morales, 527 US 41(1999)*.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintffs pray for an order of this Honorable Court finding that Public Act 101-652 is unconstitutionally vague and accordingly must be repealed in full.

Count VI
Injunctive Relief

174. The Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the allegations in Paragraphs 1-36.

175. A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show “(1) a clearly ascertained right in need of protection, (2) irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction, (3) no adequate remedy at law, and (4) a likelihood of success on the merits of the case.” *Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C.*, 225 Ill2d 52, 62, 866 N.E.2d 85, 91 (2006).

176. HB 3653 and Public Act 101-652 impose significant new obligations on Plaintiffs, while at the same time, fundamentally altering the criminal justice system in Illinois, especially with regard to the elimination of cash bail.

177. Plaintiff Justin Oliver is the appointed Sheriff of Brown County and pursuant to 55 ILCS 5/3-6019 is tasked with the enforcement of civil and criminal statutes, and the supervision and security of the Courthouse and any and all prisoners in his custody.

178. Plaintiff Hill is the chief law enforcement officer of Brown County and is tasked with overseeing the criminal prosecution process therein. *People v Bauer*, 402 Ill.App.3d 1149 1155, 931 N.E.2d 1283, 1289 (5th Dist. 2010); *Ware v. Carey*, 75 Ill.App.3d 906, 916, 394 N.E.2d 690, 696 (1st Dist. 1979).

179. Plaintiffs, through the use of the monetary bail system, have an interest in ensuring the continued presence of defendants during criminal proceedings brought in Brown County.
180. Furthermore, the State enjoys an interest in expediting the administration of justice. *People v. Phillips*, 242 Ill.2d 189, 196, 950 N.E.2d 1126, 1131 (2011); *People v. Abèrnathy*, 399 Ill.App3d 420, 426, 926 N.E.2d 435, 441 (2d Dist. 2010); *People v. Childress*, 276 Ill.App.3d 402, 410, 657 N.E.2d 1180, 1186 (1st Dist. 1995).
181. Additionally, should the bail provisions of Public Act 101-652 take effect on January 1, 2023, Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed because all pending cases and any new cases will be immediately affected by the provisions of that Act.
182. This interest will be fundamentally harmed by the inability to ensure a defendant's presence through monetary obligation.
183. This inability to secure the presence of defendant will unquestionably lead to significant delays in prosecution of cases, both with regards to individual cases and in the overall criminal justice system.
184. No adequate remedy at law exists, because the disruption to the criminal justice system that will occur on January 1, 2023, cannot be remedied by

monetary damages. See *Hough v. Weber*, 202 Ill.App.3d 674, 687, 560 N.E.2d 5, 15 (2nd Dist. 1990).

185. Finally, Plaintiffs have a significant likelihood of success on the merits of his underlying claims for declaratory relief as the provisions of HB 3653/Public Act 101-652 are clearly unconstitutional and were passed in an unconstitutional manner.

186. As such, a preliminary injunction should enter preventing the enforcement of any bail provisions in Public Act 101-652 until the other claims in the above captioned case can be fully litigated.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for an order from this Honorable Court finding that the Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction against the provisions of Public Act 101-652 pending the conclusion of this litigation and granting such other relief as this Court finds just and equitable.

Respectfully Submitted,

Justin Oliver,
Brown County Sheriff

Michael L. Hill
Brown County State's Attorney

By: -----
Michael L. Hill
Brown County State's Attorney

AFFIDAVIT

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to section 1-109 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1-109), I certify that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.



Michael L. Hill